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We analyze the sources of divergent national inflation rates among EMU member 
countries. At one level, we review the Irish ‘outlier’ experience; at another, we 
estimate panel regressions for the 1999-2001 period. We highlight the role played by 
differential exposure to euro exchange rate movements in explaining inflation 
divergence. In addition, we find evidence that output gaps and a “price level 
convergence” effect have also been important. We draw some policy conclusions for 
the accession countries that are hoping to join EMU.
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1.   Introduction 
 
It has always been well understood that regional asymmetries would represent a major 
challenge to the success of the euro. Absent the option to adjust the nominal exchange 
rate, bilateral real exchange rate movements between members of the euro zone are 
coterminous with relative inflation differentials: real appreciation is generated by 
above-average inflation; a large real depreciation may involve actual deflation.  An 
extensive ex ante literature discussed these issues.  This paper looks at what has 
happened ex post in the first years of the single currency. 
 
Three main factors were not fully known to the authors of ex ante studies.  First, the 
scale and nature of asymmetric shocks; second, the evolution and potential 
convergence of monetary transmission mechanisms (Angeloni et al., 2002); third, how 
conflicting interests would be resolved in the decisionmaking of the European Central 
Bank (cf. Dixit and Jensen, 2002).  Although the evolving situation regarding the 
other two will remain important over the longer term, the first effect is likely to be by 
far the most significant in interpreting the experience of the first few years against 
expectations and it is the focus of our paper.   
 
Although the ECB has done relatively well in achieving its target of medium-term 
price stability for the eurozone aggregate, regional inflation differentials since the 
beginning of 1999 have been quite marked. Most notably, Ireland and the other 
peripheral nations have been persistently at the top of the inflation league table.  In 
contrast, German inflation has been below the eurozone average. An expanded EMU 
with the entry of the accession countries will surely lead to even greater inflation 
differentials in the future. 
 
Understanding the sources of these inflation differentials is important to ensure public 
acceptance of the EMU monetary regime and in facilitating smooth adjustment. Local 
inflation rates carry many of the standard “costs of inflation” by affecting those on 
fixed nominal incomes, real returns on savings and investments and private and public 
wage negotiations. To what extent was the divergence caused by asymmetric nominal 
shocks?  To what extent was it a reflection of equilibrium real exchange rate   3
adjustment, or did it reflect economies being out-of-equilibrium? Would inflation 
rates have been more stable and differentials lower in the absence of EMU?  
Gathering initial evidence on these issues can help guide structural and fiscal policy 
responses not only in member states, but also in future potential joiners.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we review some theoretical 
considerations about relative inflation and real exchange rate movements among 
members of a currency union. Section 3 studies in detail the Irish experience, which 
has special significance since Ireland has been at the top of the inflation table since 
the launch of the single currency. We turn to the factors driving inflation differentials 
across the broader eurozone in section 4. Section 5 addresses the counterfactual of 
what  might have happened under independent national monetary policies. Section 6 
assesses the policy implications for prospective new members of the eurozone. 
Finally, concluding comments are offered in section 7. 
 
2.  Why understanding differential inflation matters 
 
If average eurozone inflation is being kept at an optimal level, why might one worry 
about differences emerging as between countries?  After all, regions within nations do 
not have identical inflation rates, nor do states within other currency unions.  
Moreover, it is generally accepted that that the European Central Bank can only 
attempt to control the area-wide aggregate inflation rate, with no tools at its disposal 
to address variation in inflation across member countries.   
 
Indeed, some sources of inflation rate differences within the EMU are entirely 
innocuous, or even benign: 
 
−  Where countries begin with different price levels, convergence towards a 
common price level necessarily entails a deviation in inflation rates.  In this 
case also, differing measured inflation rates can be regarded as benign in that 
they betoken a convergence towards long-run equilibrium. A variant of this 
case is when the long-run relative price level across countries is a function of 
relative incomes, relative wealth levels or relative productivities: in this case, a 
faster-growing country may naturally have temporarily higher inflation in the   4
transition to its new long-run equilibrium relative price level (this is a loose 
statement of the widely-invoked Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis).   
 
−  The basket of goods may differ from country to country so that even if all 
individual prices are the same, the basket average is different.   For the small 
price movements that have occurred since EMU began, this is unlikely to have 
been a serious problem and we will not return to it. 
 
Nevertheless, not all inflation differentials are of this harmless variety.  There seem to 
be two main dimensions to possible concerns about differentials: the fear of sustained 
inflation differentials and the fear of weak adjustment mechanisms that lead to boom-
bust cycles. 
 
First, the fear of sustained inflation in some regions.  Underlying the adoption of 
EMU was a policy model in which centralized monetary policy would be sufficient to 
keep long-run inflation under control throughout the union.  If diverging inflation 
rates in the early years of the system are extrapolated to the prospect of long-run 
sustained inflation differentials, this can naturally give rise to a concern that 
something might be wrong with the model.  In that event, national governments that 
are concerned about the welfare of their residents – for whom it is local inflation rates 
that are relevant – will be faced with the political imperative of reducing excessive 
inflation, but now without having recourse to monetary instruments.
 123 
 
To be sure, welfare analysis does not ascribe very large aggregate welfare losses to 
inflation rates in the range recently experienced by eurozone members, but some 
estimates are still far from zero (cf. Lucas, 2000). Moreover, there are distributional 
effects, with a novel feature for the currency union, in that (with the nominal interest 
                                                 
1 As is well understood from a vast range of empirical studies, trade is not perfectly frictionless even 
within currency unions. Moreover, nontradables (especially housing costs) loom large in the overall 
cost of living. As such, residents of any given member state cannot perfectly insulate themselves from 
an increase in the domestic price level relative to price levels elsewhere in euroland.     
2 Especially if the population is largely immobile (today’s resident is tomorrow’s voter) as compared 
with economies with higher rates of inter-regional mobility (today’s resident may be a voter elsewhere 
tomorrow). Given the short life of the euro, euroland voters are more likely to hold national 
governments responsible for addressing inflation concerns, whereas citizens in a currency union of 
long-standing may view inflation differentials as outside the scope of local government.  
3 National fiscal policies are also constrained by balanced budget rules and restrictions on the ability to 
vary indirect taxation.   5
rate fixed at the union level) above-average inflation implies a low or even negative 
real interest rate: at the very least, this may imply significant wealth transfers (e.g. 
from creditors to debtors) and may also push up local asset prices (e.g. housing). 
 
An exaggerated national response to a perception of persistent excessive inflation – or 
deflation – could spill over to the rest of the union.  A country that is experiencing 
sustained deflation might opt to unleash a large fiscal expansion, violating the rules of 
the Stability and Growth Pact and potentially disrupting eurozone financial markets.
4   
 
The second, and more plausible, main concern relates to weaker adjustment 
mechanisms implying more frequent and prolonged relative price misalignments, or 
alternating overheating and recession. Even if long-run inflation rates do indeed 
converge throughout the union, temporary asymmetric shocks to relative prices can be 
expected from a variety of sources.   
 
For instance, if there are short-run supply rigidities, an aggregate demand disturbance 
will feed into domestic inflation and a real exchange rate change. Such inflation may 
be purely transitory but is potentially dangerous especially if it triggers persistence 
mechanisms that continue to operate even when the original shock has disappeared or 
supply responses have kicked in (cf. EEAG, 2002, chapter 4).  
 
Overshooting may happen via price-wage dynamics if current inflation feeds into the 
path for future wage growth; it may also occur through balance sheets, if the low 
average real interest rate associated with high inflation inside a currency union leads 
to excessive debt accumulation on the parts of households or affected businesses; and, 
in related fashion, it may also happen via the housing/property markets, by virtue of a 
run-up in local asset prices. Imperfections in factor and credit markets may mean the 
unwinding of such overhangs can involve a painful adjustment process.  In addition, it 
may be the case that even a temporary increase in domestic relative prices (i.e. a loss 
in competitiveness) can lead to a permanent loss in international market share or 
inward foreign direct investment, if hysteresis effects are important. 
                                                 
4 In a worst case scenario, an over-reacting sovereign nation, dissatisfied with the inflation 
consequences of EMU membership, could even decide to leave the currency union: this would be 
destabilizing for the entire union, especially since the current statutes do not specify how such a 
departure could be implemented.   6
 
‘Imported’ inflation remains a threat even for a currency union, if member countries 
have different exposures to extra-union trade. Most directly, a member country that 
consumes imports from a non-member country will experience different inflationary 
pressures if the euro exchange rate depreciates as compared to a member country that 
conducts all its trade with other member countries. There are also indirect effects: the 
within-EMU competitiveness of a firm could be adversely affected if it relied on 
imported materials from a non-EMU country when its competitors were sourcing 
from within the EMU.  Unless the contractual and technical conditions were such that 
the firm could quickly and fully switch its source of material supplies, the firm’s 
profitability could be badly damaged perhaps resulting in layoffs or even bankruptcy.  
The sharp movements in exchange rates between the euro and the US dollar make this 
a point of empirical relevance in the present context. 
 
Indeed, inflation differentials in the eurozone could turn out to be larger and more 
persistent than in some other currency unions. Relative to the United States, inter-
regional smoothing mechanisms are absent: migration is weaker and there is no strong 
federal fiscal system.  Domestic fiscal policy is also unlikely to be an effective 
counterweight. As is increasingly well appreciated, the effectiveness of discretionary 
fiscal policy is weak and uncertain.
5 Moreover, even if fiscal policy could be usefully 
deployed as a stabilization device, its flexibility is constrained by the Growth and 
Stability Fact and long-term sustainability concerns in several member countries.  
 
An in-built adjustment problem for a currency union is the pro-cyclical interplay 
between regional inflation and real interest rates. Since any intra-union real exchange 
rate shift has to be accomplished via inflation differentials, a booming economy that 
displays relatively high inflation will also have a correspondingly low real interest 
rate, adding fuel to overheating tendencies.  As a result, the coolant effect of real 
appreciation through a loss of competitiveness is likely only to operate at a more 
gradual pace. This persistence mechanism is reinforced if the wage-setting process is 
not perfectly flexible, such that current rather than prospective inflation influences 
wage determination. 
                                                 
5 See Perotti (2003) and the references therein. However see EEAG (2003) for proposals that could 
improve the capability of discretionary fiscal policy to act as stabilizing force.   7
 
Along another dimension, we note also that from a theoretical perspective regional 
inflation differentials may also potentially affect the optimal policy for the ECB. As 
pointed out by Benigno (2000) and others, regional asymmetries when combined with 
variation in the severity of nominal rigidities across the eurozone require that the ECB 
optimally target the inflation rate of the regions with the highest degrees of price/wage 
stickiness, in order facilitate relative price adjustment at the lowest welfare cost. It has 
also been suggested the existence of significant inflation differentials should prompt 
the ECB to raise its inflation target in order to allow those countries that require real 
depreciation to avoid absolute deflation (Sinn and Reutter, 2001). 
 
The dangers, real and perceived, of inflation differentials are thus not insignificant. 
They certainly confirm the importance of understanding the behaviour of inflation 
differentials among eurozone member countries. Moreover, the prospective 
enlargement of the eurozone with the entry of accession countries means that inflation 
asymmetries are likely to be even stronger in the future. It is therefore timely and 
appropriate to address this question. 
 
3.  The ‘Outlier’: Ireland’s Inflation Surge in EMU: External or Internal 
Causes? 
Ireland’s experience calls for special attention: Irish inflation, below 5 per cent for 
almost fifteen years and averaging just under 2 per cent per annum in the five years 
prior to EMU membership, suddenly accelerated in late 1999 and has since then been 
persistently at the top of the EMU inflation league. CPI inflation touched an annual 
rate of 7 per cent in the twelve months to November 2000, before retreating to the 4-5 
per cent range (Figure 3.1).   
 
What went wrong for Ireland and is it a harbinger of the likely prospects for the 
accession countries?  We argue that, in addition to domestic factors, EMU itself has 
contributed to the surge in Irish inflation.  EMU did remove a potentially effective 
instrument of policy restraint (nominal exchange rate adjustment).  Furthermore, by 
lowering nominal and real interest rates, EMU added an important demand fillip, 
especially manifested in soaring house prices.  And the inflationary impulse, 
exceptionally strong for Ireland, that was generated by euro weakness in the early   8
years of the system might well have been offset by an appreciation of the Irish pound 
within the wide EMS band that was in effect from 1993-1998.
6   
 
Nevertheless, external factors are only part of the story of Irish inflation.  These 
positive shocks were all superimposed on an economy running close to capacity, with 
effectively full employment and substantial net immigration.  A sharp upward shift in 
the trend of real wages had already got under way by 1998.  The sizable relaxation of 
fiscal policy after 2000 also added to domestic demand.  Against this background, it is 
unsurprising that external shocks should have had such a striking effect. 
 
Productivity 
It is important to recognize that little if any of this inflation deviation is a reflection of 
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Ireland’s boom has been largely one of employment 
growth, and not exceptional productivity gains.  Much of the very high apparent 
productivity growth in Irish manufacturing over the past several decades is an artifact 
of transfer pricing, and Ireland is already close to the EMU-average of per capita GNP 
(Honohan and Walsh 2002).  
 
Exchange rate 
From late 1996 to 2000, Ireland’s nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by 
some 17 per cent (Figure 3.3).  This was much more than in other EMU members, 
essentially because Ireland has by far the smallest share of its trade with euro-area 
participants (31 per cent, compared to 54 per cent for the others).  Furthermore, the 
extreme openness of the Irish economy means that almost a third of aggregate demand 
(over 55 per cent of GDP) is met by non-euro area imports.  Although much of that 
trade has something of the character of an entrepôt business, nevertheless, the sharp 
fall in the value of the currency against the US dollar and sterling from 1997 on has 
implied a much larger cost push factor than experienced by other members.  
Assuming a lag of several quarters in the pass-through of exchange rate to domestic 
                                                 
6 In recognition of upward pressure on the real exchange rate, Ireland undertook a 3 percent nominal 
appreciation against its EMU partners in April 1998. A larger nominal appreciation at that time could 
have forestalled some of the inflationary pressure that was experienced after the formation of EMU.   9
CPI, Figure 3.3 points to a simple mechanism, namely that much of Ireland’s inflation 
of 2000-2002 can be interpreted as a pass-through effect from the depreciation.
7 
 
Had it not been for adherence to the common currency, historical experience suggests 
that a surge in the value of the US dollar and sterling would have resulted in 
appreciation of the Irish pound against the DM.
8  To that extent, some of this imported 
inflation has been due to EMU accession. 
 
Interest rates and house prices 
Given the very high interest rates previously experienced, whether measured in 
nominal, exchange-rate corrected, or real terms (Figure 3.4), it was always clear that 
EMU accession would lead to a sizable step reduction in interest rates and a reduction 
in their volatility.
 9  In the event, since EMU began, Irish real interest rates have been 
the lowest in the union at an average of minus 1 percent (reflecting the higher inflation 
rate).   
 
This represents a sizable change in intertemporal prices facing resident households (as 
well as locally exposed firms on average), and this may be expected to alter local 
asset prices, such as that of housing.  The Irish property boom since the late 1990s has 
pushed real house prices to well over 250 percent of the levels of the early 1970s and 
mid-1980s.  Demographic pressures and real income growth have obviously 
contributed, and there may have been a non-fundamental (bubble) component but 
there will also have been an important contribution of capitalization effects of the 
                                                 
7 The speed of pass-through seems to have slowed in recent years; cf. FitzGerald (2001) and FitzGerald 
and Shortall (1998) who point to a switch from sterling-based to euro-based pricing by the large UK 
groups which dominate Irish retailing. 
8 For example a typical log-linear regression of the Irish pound/deutsche mark rate on the bilateral rates 
vis-à-vis the US dollar of the pound sterling and deutsche mark on quarterly data for the wide-band 
period 93Q2-97Q3 produces: 
eDM/IEP = 2.76 + 0.52 e$/₤ + 0.62 eDM/$    ρ=0.64 
              (2.9)     (2.2)            (6.2)                 (2.6)     R
2=0.896;  DW=1.71 
 
9 The decade from 1983-93, during the narrow-band EMS period, saw real interest rates averaging 7.44 
per cent per annum; excess returns on Irish money market instruments were more that 250 basis points 
relative to Germany during that period.  In the wide-bank EMS period real interest rates fell to an 
average of 3.86 percent, but, with monetary policy holding money market rates as tight as possible it 
was not in the last couple of months of 1998 that nominal short interest rates (including floating 
mortgage rates) converged to the EMU average.  Most mortgages in Ireland are still at floating rates, 
but in the run-up to EMU there was a big shift to mortgages interest rates fixed typically for three-to-
five years.  By early 1999, these accounted for 38 per cent of total mortgages; since then, most new 
mortgages have reverted to the floating model.   10




12 Just how big this capitalization effect is depends very 
sensitively on how large is the fall in the market’s expectation of the likely average of 
real interest rates in coming years – at the extreme, a fall from 7 per cent real to close 
to zero real (close to the actual shift between pre-1993 and post 1999) could warrant a 
price doubling.   
 
In principle, the capitalization effect need not require a change in the flow of credit, 
though in practice, recourse to bank credit to finance purchases of housing at the new 
higher prices is to be expected.
13  In practice, the decline in real interest rates by early 
1999 was accompanied by a surge in (private sector) credit growth.  However, the 
peak in house price inflation preceded the surge in credit just as it preceded the fall in 
interest rates.  Credit expansion pushed from the supply-side could also have boosted 
the price of non-traded goods other than housing.
 14  However, it is not possible to 
identify a close econometric link between the 1999 surge in credit demand and the 
upturn in CPI inflation, and subsequently credit growth generally moderated even as 
CPI inflation accelerated.  
 
Internal factors: Wage behaviour 
Real wage rates were remarkably slow to increase during most of the 1990s, despite 
the rapid growth in employment and a tightening labour market.  This is partly 
because employers could still attract workers (from abroad and via an increasing 
                                                 
10 There has been strong immigration since the early 1990s – a reversal of historical experience – as 
well a rapid aggregate income growth reflecting the growth in employment and decline in 
unemployment.  Shifting tax considerations have also been quite influential in this context (Bacon, 
McCabe and Murphy, 1999).  After a sharp but brief interruption in 2001, the resumption of rapid 
house-price growth thereafter was widely attributed to the re-introduction of tax incentives.  
11 Econometric analysis of the price of housing in Ireland 1979-98 (Roche, 1999) suggested that rising 
real incomes and falling interest rates could explain much of the rise in prices to end-1998, though he 
found prices to be about 12% above their fundamental values at that date (recall that there has been a 
further 40 per cent increase in real house prices since then).  
12 Note, though, that the peak of the house-price inflation was in the Spring of 1998, hence before the 
main decline in interest rates.  Nevertheless, house buyers were already being urged by estate agents to 
discount the likely decline in mortgage servicing costs which by then were virtually certain (and which 
had indeed already been somewhat priced into those mortgage products that offered initial periods of 
fixed interest). 
13 Especially in an economy with an open capital market and easy access to foreign lending through the 
banking system. Retail credit institutions in Ireland increased their net position vis-à-vis Irish residents 
by 10 per cent of their total balance sheet in the first two years of EMU. 
14 New foreign entrants into the mortgage market have narrowed spreads and perhaps reduced non-
price (creditworthiness appraisal) criteria for lending.   11
participation rate) and a series of multi-year neo-corporatist national wage agreements 
also contributed to wage restraint.  These agreements were facilitated by reductions in 
income tax rates that allowed take-home pay of production workers to increase far 
more rapidly than wage costs to employers.  This wage restraint was one of the main 
keys to the employment boom of the 1990s (Honohan and Walsh 2002). 
 
From 1997, a less restrictive wage agreement and an increasing tendency for local 
wage rate increases above nationally-agreed levels saw real wages in manufacturing 
start to increase steadily, so that by late 2001 they had reached 14 percent above their 
1996 average level (Figure 3.2).
15   
 
To some extent the recent increase in real wages reflects a catch-up relative to a 
period of artificial wage-repression (centralized wage agreements), restoring 
equilibrium between real product wages and marginal productivity.  In addition, 
however, it also reflects a tightening labour market, as the traditional pool of 
expatriates dried up, and as the demand price of others (especially those more 
sensitive to house prices) increased.  Finally there may also be exercise of market 
power by trade-unions in the tighter market. The affordability of these wage increases 
even by marginal exporters to non-euro countries was, of course, enhanced by the 
currency depreciation that began about the same time and, as such, part of the real 
wage increase can be attributed to currency movements.   
 
Employers in non-traded sectors certainly attempted to pass on rising wage costs and 
this can be regarded as an additional twist to consumer price inflation in 2001-2002 
when the direct effect of exchange rate depreciation was beginning to wear off. 
However, we view the source of this wage-driven inflation as primarily reflecting an 




                                                 
15 Historical data on other sectors is remarkably deficient, but the new series covering services 
employment also shows similar increases from 1998. 
16 Recall that the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis assumes full employment and competitive factor and 
product markets.   12
Internal factors: Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy has certainly helped sustain high inflation in the last few years, 
especially with the rapid shift from high and rising surplus (before 2001) to deficit 
today.  Even in the earlier years when revenue buoyancy kept the budget in growing 
surplus, fiscal policy was not withdrawing demand to the extent that the improved 
fiscal accounts reflected falling external debt service (as the external debt to GDP 
ratio declined), and increasing tax payments by foreign firms (exploiting the low tax 
regime).  After 2000, the budget surplus declined rapidly with a turnaround of almost 
6 per cent of GDP in just two years, mainly due to autonomous tax reductions and 
spending policy increases.   
 
Summary on Ireland 
Exchange rate depreciation from 1997 has been a major driver of inflation 
acceleration in Ireland after 1999.  Not only did it raise import prices directly but it 
improved wage competitiveness, thereby facilitating a sizable increase in real wages.  
The fall in interest rates as Ireland joined EMU fuelled a house-price boom whose 
other causes were likely more important.  That CPI inflation persisted after the 
currency stopped falling reflects domestic factors (the continued rise in real wages 
and the sharp relaxation in the budgetary position), in addition to delayed pass-
through.  Ireland’s persistently higher inflation does not, therefore, cast doubt on the 
long-run convergence of inflation rates in the union.  But to what extent wage and 
house-price inflation embody overshooting dynamics that may require painful 
adjustment in the future remains hard to establish with confidence.  
 
4.  Divergent Inflation Experience in Practice: Aggregate Data 
 
In this section, we widen the focus to the whole eurozone. The close, albeit lagged, 
correlation between the hump-shaped time series of EMU inflation and movements in 
the USD/EUR exchange rate is documented: the correlation is observed across the 
zone, but has also been associated with a widening of the dispersion of inflation rates 
since EMU began. However, we show that this has been matched by a convergence of 
absolute price levels, a convergence which has been a unnoticed but invariable 
characteristic of episodes of dollar strength for several decades. 
   13
The initial decline in nominal interest rates – a once-off asymmetric shock – does 
seem to have been associated with differential effects on property price levels.  And, 
contrary to a simplistic view of the price process in a currency union, national output 
gaps continue to have a significant impact on national inflation rates, although 
government deficits have no separate effect (apart from their indirect effect on output 
gaps). 
 
The section concludes with a formal modeling of how these factors have interacted 
jointly to determine national inflation rates.  
 
Converging inflation rates to EMU…and then diverging! 
After a long period of decline, reflecting the convergence demanded by the Maastricht 
Treaty, mean and median inflation in the EMU area bottomed out (somewhat 
ironically perhaps), in the first months of the new currency, namely during the quarter 
to March 1999: see Figure 4.1.  Since then, the rebound has, however, only been a 
modest one from about 1.25 per cent to between 2 and 2.5 per cent.
17  By 2002, 
inflation rates were slowing again in the EMU, giving a generally hump-shape 




Dispersion of inflation rates between member countries, whether measured by the 
overall spread between maximum and minimum, by standard deviation, or by the 
coefficient of variation, has also widened since 1999, though it remains well below 
the figures recorded before 1997 (Figure 4.1).  Indeed, the increase of 0.2 percentage 
points in standard deviation (from the 1999 quarterly average of 0.8 per cent to 1.0 per 
cent in 2001-2002) is much less than the increase in mean and median of more than 
1.0 percentage points.  
 
The major outliers in the years before EMU began were Greece and Portugal.  Since 
the start of EMU the clustering of countries has remained quite tight (Figure 4.2).  In 
only one country (Ireland) has 1999-2002 inflation differed from the EMU-wide mean 
                                                 
17 Nevertheless, the rebound in dispersion is striking relative to the sustained and almost complete 
convergence in bill and bond yields (cf. Adjaouté and Danthine, 2002). 
18 Of course, Greece was not a member of EMU until 2001.  Much of the empirical work below 
excludes Greece.   14
by more than one standard deviation. Ireland’s mean annual inflation in this period 
was 4.1 per cent, compared with an EMU average of 2.5.  The next highest countries 
were Greece, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain with between 3.1 and 3.2 per cent. 
 
Comparing Inflation Dispersion in EMU to the United States 
Though the dispersion of inflation rates took some observers by surprise, Table 4.1,  
reporting summary statistics on the distribution of national/regional inflation rates in 
the eurozone and the US over 1999-2001, shows that the dispersion, as measured for 
example by the coefficient of variation (CV) was not dramatically wider in the 
eurozone during these years. Indeed, the range for inflation is bigger for US regions in 
each of the years 1999-2001. This table indicates that, at least over this period, the 
degree of inflation dispersion in the eurozone is not out of line with that occurring in 
the other major advanced country currency union. 
 
Moreover, if national/regional price levels have a common long-run trend, inflation 
differentials should diminish over time. Although we do not have a long time series 
for the eurozone, Table 4.2 offers some relevant comparisons. For the ‘Euro Core’ 
countries, the range in average annual inflation rates (measured in a common 
currency) was only 0.2 percentage points over 1972-1998. Indeed, this is lower than 
the ranges calculated for US regions over various time intervals, as is shown in 
columns (2) and (3). These data suggest that there is a substantial non-permanent 
component to inflation differentials. That said, the existing evidence is that inflation 
differentials are only eliminated slowly: Cecchetti et al (2002) estimate the half-life of 
convergence for US regions to be nine years. 
 
This comparison with the United States experience is instructive: inflation 
differentials in the eurozone do not appear to be extraordinary; moreover, differentials 
should be reversed over time. However, even if the distribution of relative inflation 
rates turns out to continue to be similar between the eurozone and the United States, 
inflation asymmetries may be more troublesome for the eurozone than for the United 
States, for the reasons we argued in section 2. 
 
Exchange rates a major factor in explaining inflation divergence 
   15
Section 2 above already flagged differential import price movements as a possible 
source of inflation differentials.  Shifts in exchange rates are an important source of 
such movements.  Even though the exchange rate movements are the same for all 
EMU members, the widely differing trade patterns means that the impact on prices 
can be quite different.
19 
 
We show this in regression A in Table 4.3. A pooled regression of quarterly changes 
in national nominal effective exchange rate indices on the euro-dollar exchange rate 
1998.4-2002.2 produces an 
2 R of 0.85 fixed effects are not significant.  The 
coefficients on the dollar rate, estimated quite precisely, vary widely from 0.07 in 
Luxembourg and 0.11 for Austria to 0.24 for Finland and 0.35 for Ireland.  Thus the 
impact, during the EMU period, of the change in the euro-dollar rate for the Irish 
effective exchange rate index was five times that for Luxembourg, taking into account 
the correlated changes in other exchange rates. 
 
So far as the time-path of euro-zone inflation during EMU is concerned, the first thing 
to note is that the hump-shaped pattern already noted of average four-quarter price 
level movements in EMU (Figures 4.1 and 4.2) is rather strikingly paralleled by a 
hump-shaped pattern of four-quarter exchange rate changes (euro against the dollar) 
(Figure 4.3).   Actually, the same pattern is observed for most of the countries.  For 
Germany the link can be traced further back to the previous exchange rate cycle 1997-
98, though the timing of the link is somewhat different (Figure 4.4).
20 In fact, the 
average lag for Germany in the EMU period appears to be about 6 months, apparently 
increasing as time goes on, whereas it appears to be about one year for the average.
21  
                                                 
19 Even if trade patterns were identical, variation in rates of pass through could still lead to inflation 
divergence in response to an exchange rate shock. This has some relevance: a large (albeit declining) 
share of Irish consumer imports has traditionally been invoiced in Sterling, whereas the same goods 
imported into Germany or France might be invoiced in euro, due to different distribution networks. The 
determinants of exchange rate pass through are the subject of much current theoretical and empirical 
work in international macroeconomics. At a broad level, we may expect the introduction of the euro to 
increase the proportion of imported goods that are priced in euro rather than in foreign currency, which 
will act to insulate eurozone prices from temporary exchange rate shocks. 
20 This could possibly be because of a less accommodating monetary policy since EMU began, or to the 
extent that the causality may have been from a price surge in Germany in 1997-1998 to exchange rate 
movements, whereas whereas it was undoubtedly the other way in 2000-2001. 
21 The amplitude of Ireland’s hump-shape is the highest, but then, as already noted, its trade exposure 
to non-EMU partners is also the largest.  The correlation across countries between average inflation and 
the ratio of non-EMU trade to GDP is significantly positive, but mainly because of the Irish data point.  
This question can also be examined at the level of national trade-weighted exchange rate indexes.   16
 
As a preliminary bivariate verification and quantification of the relation between 
exchange rates and price levels, we estimated a panel regression on quarterly data 
linking national CPI changes to previous exchange rate movements (results of 
estimating a more fully-specified model on annual data are presented later).  We 
include an error correction term to capture the long-run relation between exchange 
rate and price level trends: we allow the long-run coefficient  4i a to vary across 
countries, to take into account variation in exposure to extra-eurozone trade. The 
model estimated was: 
  it t i it t i it e a p a e a a p ε + − + ∆ + = ∆ − − − ] [ 2 4 1 3 1 2 1    (1) 
 
The results of this regression are shown in Table 4.3 (Regressions B, C, D,E) and 
display a convincingly close fit, whether it is the dollar-euro exchange rate or the 
nominal effective index that is used.  Moreover, the largest coefficients a4i are for the 
outlying countries for inflation as a whole (Ireland, Greece, Netherlands and 
Portugal). 
 
Price Level Convergence 
Despite the existence of the common currency, it is not correct to interpret inflation 
differentials between members as implying a deviation from PPP in first differences.  
For there is the rest of the world to take into account, and to the extent that trading 
partners differ, then it may be that some of the raw inflation differentials between 
EMU members have had the effect of reducing deviations from PPP measured on a 
trade-weighted basis.  Moreover, if initial price levels differ, inflation differentials are 
required for convergence to PPP. This subsection examines the convergence of PPP-
adjusted exchange rates (a measure of absolute price convergence). 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the relation between productivity growth and real exchange rate 
appreciation for post-EMU and a representative pre-EMU period for a set of European 
countries.
22, 23  The positive correlation implied by a crude version Balassa-Samuelson 
                                                 
22 We include non-EMU members here since long-run real exchange rate dynamics should be in force 
regardless of the exchange rate regime.  
23 See Alesina et al (2001) for a simplified rendition of this explanation. See Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1996) for a more comprehensive textbook treatment. Devereux (2000) makes the point that 
productivity growth may be more important    17
hypothesis is not present in this short period. Indeed, there is actually a strong 
negative correlation between productivity growth and real exchange rate appreciation 
during 1998-2001 (thanks largely to Ireland and Greece, and also the UK). As a 
matter of theory, this is not too surprising: Benigno and Thoenissen (2002) and 
FitzGerald (2002) have recently emphasized that fast productivity growth can lead to 
real depreciation. One factor is that it may generate a terms of trade deterioration; 
another is that productivity growth in the nontraded sector should be associated with 
real depreciation. 
 
Nevertheless, a positive cross-sectional relationship between PPP/exchange rate and 
the level of GDP per capita has existed consistently for several decades among the 
EMU members.
24,25  And the gradual convergence in living standards as between 
different countries has contributed to some long-term convergence of price levels 
across countries.
26  For example, the coefficient of variation of PPP/exchange rate 
(which we will call the index of price level dispersion) declined from an average of 19 
per cent in the early 1970s to 14 per cent in 2001.  But there have been wide 
fluctuations over the period, with the index going as high as 24 per cent in 1978.   
 
Interestingly, movements in the index have been correlated, not only with the 
dispersion of per capita income, but strikingly with the DM/dollar market exchange 
rate (Figure 4.6).
 27   When the US dollar is strong, prices in Europe converge.  
Although the empirical relationship has been quite tight, this point does not appear to 
have been noticed in the literature over the years; whatever forces underlay it in the 
                                                 
24 The positive relation between output per capita and price levels may reflect the Balassa-Samuelson 
mechanism but also non-homotheticity in tastes and the importance of quasi-fixed factors (e.g. land) in 
the nontraded sector. 
25 The slope of this line appears to have flattened, however, presumably reflecting closer good market 
integration. (Figure 4.7).  (Detailed regression results not reported). 
26 See also Rogers (2002) who uses a different measure for the price level (from the EIU) and finds that 
the greatest reduction in price dispersion took place in the early 1990s, rather than being associated 
with the advent of the single currency. Beck and Weber (2001), Chen (2002) and Imbs et al (2002) 
study price dispersion across European regions but the focus is on (possibly nonlinear) speeds of 
convergence rather than the determinants of the price gaps. 
27 The cross-sectional standard deviation of per capita GDP enters with a negative “wrong” sign if 
included in this regression on its own on annual data 1970-2001, but this is due to a data discontinuity 
in 1991 after the unification of Germany enters the statistics.  Accounting for this with a slope dummy 
restores the “right” sign.  The fit of the resulting equation is quite good.  It implies that a 10% per cent 
movement in the dollar/DM rate narrows the index by about 0.75 per cent .The regression is: 
Coeffvart= -0.14 + 1.69 Gdppct – 0.54 Uni*Gdppct + 0.075 $/DMt 
       (1.4)    (2.9)               (7.0)                         (5.3)       
R
2=0.811    DW= 1.61   18
past are likely to have been the drivers once again of the price level convergence 
during the first three years of EMU.
 28   
 
Other policy factors: fiscal policy and interest rates 
In addition to the roles played by effective exchange rate movements and price level 
convergence, what policy-related factors have contributed to inflation differentials 
within the eurozone?  In the case of interest rate and fiscal deficit policy, a common 
rule structure was nominally in effect (much weaker in the case of fiscal policy).  But 
once again, as with the exchange rate, the actual impact of the evolution of interest 
rate and fiscal variables on inflation rates was, if anything, to contribute to 
divergence. 
 
In the presence of nominal price or wage stickiness, aggregate demand factors play a 
role in driving inflation and real exchange rates in the short run and can push output 
above its long-run potential level. The pairwise correlation between output gaps and 
inflation rates was 0.50 over 1999-2001.
29  
 
One factor driving aggregate demand in some countries during this period was a sharp 
decline in real interest rates. The convergence of both nominal and real interest rates 
in the different member countries was sharp as the start date for EMU approached.  
But, while nominal rates remained bunched together, the spread between real interest 
rates widened out again subsequently as inflation diverged.  Ironically, this placed 
some of those countries with previously high real interest rates (such as Ireland, 
Spain, Portugal and Greece) at the lower end of the range later: Figure 4.8 clearly 
shows a negative correlation between pre- and post-EMU real short-term rates.  The 
fall in real interest rates in those countries with higher than average inflation is a 
potentially destabilizing factor, sustaining spending levels and hence upward demand 
pressure on prices in exactly the countries that already have relatively high inflation, 
hence working against the factors that tend towards inflation convergence. 
 
                                                 
28 For example, Crucini et al. (2001) who stress that nominal exchange rate movements were of little 
effect in influencing real exchange rates over a five-year interval.  But see Papell (2002). 
29 It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the empirical failings of the existing measures of 
output gaps. We employ the OECD measure in this study. See also European Central Bank (1999).   19
In addition its general contribution to excess demand, we already noted for Ireland the 
potentially large contribution of a fall in nominal and real interest rates to property 
price inflation.  There is a fairly strong negative cross-sectional correlation between 
real interest rate declines in the run-up to EMU and commercial property inflation 
1995-2001 (the correlation is –0.67).
30 Beyond the wealth effect of rising property 
values on domestic consumption, a boom in the property market may also store up a 
future adjustment problem. 
 
Turning to another policy influence on the level of domestic demand, fiscal positions 
are partly endogenous, especially to the business cycle and to interest rates. 
Furthermore, budget deficits are somewhat constrained by the Stability and Growth 
pact, as well as being influenced by the scale and direction of intra-EU transfers.  
Nevertheless, to a large extent, within the period under review, the cyclically-adjusted 
primary surplus has been largely under the control of national governments, although 
there may be a policy feedback from observed inflation.  However, there appears to be 
no cross-sectional correlation between inflation and the cyclically-adjusted primary 
surplus during 1999-2001: the bivariate correlation is –0.002.  
 
With respect to another dimension of fiscal policy, changes in the indirect tax burden 
tend to show up in consumer prices.  In principle, this is quite a complex thing to 
measure.  However if we take the change in the share of GDP taken in taxes on goods 
and services as a rough and ready measure, we will get some indication of trends in 
indirect taxation.  Interestingly, calculating this change for the period 1998-2001, we 
find that the correlation with post-EMU inflation is insignificantly negative; even if 
the outlier Ireland (for which the ratio of consumption to GDP declined sharply during 
the period) is removed, the correlation, although now positive, is still insignificant. 
 
Panel Regressions 
To conclude this section, we report results for multivariate panel regressions to 
establish the relative contributions of some of the key factors discussed above in 
                                                 
30 For the eight countries where data is available.  There is no cross-sectional bivariate correlation with 
residential property inflation – Italy, with a sharp fall in interest rates, experienced only modest house 
price rises 1995-2001.  Starting with 1995 allows anticipatory price movements as discussed (in fact, 
the correlations for 1998-2001 are not significant.    20
driving inflation differentials within the eurozone over 1999-2001. A fairly general 
specification for inflation differentials can be written as 
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**
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it t π π  are the annual national and eurozone inflation rates respectively;  ,
E
it t zz  
are national and eurozone variables that exert short-term influence on the inflation 
rate;  ,
E
it t P P are the national and eurozone price levels and 
** ,
E
it t P P are the national and 
eurozone long-run equilibrium price levels.
31  
 
If we assert that the eurozone countries share a common long-run price level, this 
expression can be simplified to 
  
  ( ) 11 *( )
EE E
it t it t it t it zz P P π πβ δ ε −− −= −− − +  (3) 
 
The assumption of a common long-run price level is plausible for a putative 
convergence club such as the eurozone, with tight trade and institutional linkages 
eliminating income and productivity differentials over time.
32 
33 We also 
experimented with the alternative hypotheses that even long-run price levels may 
diverge due to productivity or income differences and we report results below for 
                                                 
31 We do not include country fixed effects, since it is implausible that there exist permanent inflation 
differentials across eurozone member countries. This specification assumes that inflation differentials 
are stationary; equivalently, that national and eurozone price levels are cointegrated. Clearly, we cannot 
test these assumptions given the short time interval but these assumptions are firmly grounded in 
economic theory and so we are comfortable in treating these as maintained hypotheses. We note that 
much recent empirical work on real exchange rates postulates a non-linear speed of adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium. Our short time span does not permit us to investigate such nonlinearities. Finally, 
this specification implicitly assumes a common speed of adjustment at local and European levels: 
again, more data could allow us to relax that assumption. 
32 See also Froot and Rogoff (1995) and the empirical work by Zussman (2003). The latter finds 
evidence of absolute convergence in price levels among OECD countries. 
33 We earlier remarked that the degree of price dispersion in Europe appears to comove with cycles in 
the euro-dollar (DM-dollar) exchange rate. To allow for this cyclical effect, one could write an 
expanded specification  11 ** * *
it t it it it it zP D O L D U M P π φβ δ γ ε
−− =+ − − +where DOLDUM 
takes the value 1 if the dollar is in a strong phase and -1 if it is weak. In a short period during which the 
dollar was continuously strong, it is not possible to disentangle the long-term and cyclical price 
convergence effects. We return to this point later.   21
these cases. However, we do not find a significant role for these variables and so 
focus on the more restricted specification in our main discussion.
34  
 
In turn, the eurozone variables can be linearly combined into a time dummy, which 
allows us to write  
 
  1 ** it t it it it zP π φβ δ ε − = +− +  (4) 
 
Following our analysis in the previous subsection, we include three variables in our z-
vector. These are the rate of change in the nominal effective exchange rate (lagged by 
one period), the impulse in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal surplus and the output gap.
35 
This gives us our empirical specification  
 
  11 12 3 it t it it it it it P NEER FISC GAP π φδ β β β ε −− =− +∆ + + + (5) 
 
where  it π  is the annual inflation rate,  1 it P −  is the lagged price level,  1 it NEER − ∆  is the 
lagged growth rate of the nominal effective exchange rate,  it FISC  is the impulse in 
the cyclically-adjusted primary surplus and  it GAP  is the output gap.
36   
 
Tables 4.4-5 show the results from the panel estimation. Table 4.4 displays the pooled 
OLS equations; GMM estimates are shown in Table 4.5, where we instrument for the 
fiscal impulse and the output gap using lagged values of these variables. We consider 
four measures of inflation: CPI (based on HICP data); CPI excluding energy (CPI-
EN); GDP deflator (PGDP); and wages (WAGES).  
                                                 
34 Rogers (2002) also employed a productivity proxy in his empirical work but found it to be 
insignificant for this period. As is discussed further later in the paper, these variables may becomeg 
more important once the eurozone is enlarged to incorporate the accession countries. 
35 Of course, the fiscal position may primarily operate by affecting the size of the output gap. We allow 
for an additional independent effect, since the fiscal balance may shift the composition of expenditure 
towards domestically-produced goods, exacerbating inflationary pressures even if the output gap is not 
affected. 
3636 We measure inflation using the Eurostat HICP data; the price level is measured by the consumption 
price level in the Penn World Tables version 6.1 (this variable is highly correlated with the OECD PPP 
measure but is conceptually more appropriate); the nominal effective exchange rate, fiscal surplus and 
the output gap are from OECD sources.  We lag the nominal effective exchange rate by one year in 
recognition of delayed pass-through from exchange rates to consumer prices. The impulse in the 
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The table shows that the price convergence effect is highly significant for the three 
price-based measures of inflation, even if not for wages.
37 For CPI inflation, the -0.03 
point estimate implies that a country with a price level one-third below the European 
average would experience an additional one percentage point of inflation. This is 
significant in terms of the inflation variation observed in the eurozone but also implies 
that the convergence process is quite gradual.  
 
The impact of the exchange rate on inflation is significant across columns (1)-(8): a 
country that undergoes a depreciation of its nominal effective exchange rate that is 
larger than the European average will also have relatively higher inflation. The point 
estimate of -0.28 in the CPI equation means that a relative depreciation of 3.5 percent 
is associated with an additional one percentage point of inflation.  This is a large 
effect: for instance, the Irish nominal effective exchange rate depreciated by a 
cumulative 11 percent during 1998-2000, whereas the French exchange rate weakened 
by only 4 percent.  
 
In the OLS estimates, the fiscal surplus is not significant; however, it is somewhat 
significant in the GMM estimates for the CPI-EN and WAGE inflation measures. The 
positive sign on this variable is contrary to prior expectations: an increase in the fiscal 
surplus is associated with relatively higher inflation. In view of its fragility, we do not 
dwell on this result. 
38 
 
Finally, the output gap is consistently important in all specifications. As might be 
expected, this variable is relatively more important for the domestically-generated 
inflation measures (the GDP deflator and wages) than for the broader indices.  
 
These results show that a considerable proportion of the inflation differentials in the 
eurozone over 1999-2001 can be systematically related to a small number of 
                                                 
37 In 1998, the Spanish and Portuguese consumer price levels were respectively 25 percent and 35 
percent below the German level. 
38 A similar positive comovement is also found by Canova and Pappa (2003), who perform a 
sophisticated instrumental-variables procedure to guard against reverse causation.   23
macroeconomic variables.
39 The price convergence effect can be viewed as a long-run 
constraining factor on inflation differentials: long-run price levels in the eurozone 
should move together.  The importance of the output gap highlights the role of short-
run imbalances in generating local inflation pressures. However, controlling for the 
output gap, there does not seem to be a strong role for the fiscal impulse in 
determining inflation.  
 
Perhaps the most novel finding is the important role played by the nominal effective 
exchange rate in explaining inflation differentials: eurozone member countries 
continue to have quite different trading patterns and hence exposure to external 
currency fluctuations is quite variable. We may view this source of inflation 
differentials as temporary along two dimensions. First, there is surely a substantial 
temporary component to the decline of the external value of the euro during 1999-
2001: indeed, recent months have seen a sustained recovery. Second, trade patterns 
will continue to evolve, with a plausible shift towards a greater proportion of intra-
eurozone trade. The importance of external trade will also decline if the eurozone club 
expands to include the ‘outs’ (especially the United Kingdom) and the accession 
countries. Moreover, to the extent that some non-joiners track the euro, this will limit 
the degree of volatility in nominal effective exchange rates (cf. Honohan and Lane, 
1999). Finally, as was already noted, the introduction of the euro should over time 
alter pricing strategies, with more imports to the eurozone priced in euro rather than in 
foreign currency, shifting the impact of exchange rate shocks from consumers to 
producers. 
 
Because they are likely to unfold over several years, it is too early to make much 
progress in detecting econometrically the danger, discussed informally above, of the 
amplitude and duration of price shocks being magnified in particular countries 
through destabilizing real interest rate and wage rate dynamics.  As a longer data set 
accumulates, this will become a priority for further research. 
 
                                                 
39 Regarding the estimation procedure, we note that serial correlation in the residuals is minor. In fact, 
taking the CPI inflation equation, the correlation between  it e and  1 it e −  is negative (-0.30). Moreover, 
there is no evidence of spatial correlation in the residuals: a regression of   () ij Ee e  on the log of 
bilateral distance yields an adjusted R
2 of 0.01 (the correlation is 0.15).    24
Robustness checks 
Tables 4.6-4.7 report the results for expanded specifications in which productivity or 
income levels are allowed to affect long-run price level differentials.
40  Since shifts in 
these variables alter the long-run equilibrium price level, we allow innovations in 
these variables in addition to the lagged level values to influence the inflation 
differential in columns (2) and (4). These variables are not significant in any of the 
specifications. Moreover, despite the reduction in degrees of freedom, the results for 
the other regressors are largely unaffected. We also ran regressions that excluded the 
fiscal variable: the results are little changed in this narrower specification (results in 
the appendix). 
 
As another sensitivity check, Table 4.8 provides the results for the subsamples 
obtained by dropping one country at a time.
41 The main results are quite stable: the 
point estimates and the t-statistics vary relatively little. The main exception is the 
fiscal variable, which turns marginally positive in a couple of subsamples.  
 
 
Relation to the existing literature 
The empirical contribution that is closest to ours is Rogers (2002). His results are 
largely complementary to ours. However, he does not include the nominal effective 
exchange rate as an explanatory variable.
42 Moreover, he does not focus specifically 
on the 1999-2001 period (he provides results instead for 1997-2001 that combine pre-
EMU and post-EMU data).
43 The European Central Bank (1999) also documents a 
strong bilateral relation between inflation differentials and output gaps but just using 
cross-sectional data for 1999. 
 
                                                 
40 We report only the estimates for the CPI measure here. The appendix contains the tables for the other 
inflation measures. 
41 Here, we just show the GMM estimates for the CPI measure. The appendix contains the other tables. 
42 He does include a measure of openness to extra-eurozone trade. However, this variable will not have 
a stable sign : during periods of euro appreciation, it should have a negative sign; and a positive sign if 
the euro depreciates.  In addition, the composition of extra-eurozone trade also matters in determining 
exposure to various bilateral exchange rate movements. This consideration is incorporated into the 
construction of the nominal effective exchange rate. 
43 His measures of the initial price level and the fiscal variables also differ from ours.   25
5.  Counterfactuals   
In the previous sections, we have documented and attempted to explain the inflation 
differentials among the EMU member countries over 1999-2001. In this section, we 
ask to what extent whether independent monetary policies would have delivered 
different outcomes.  
 
As a simple illustration of the potential scale of the difference between the actual 
interest rates observed in the EMU members and what might have been adopted by 
national central banks, we calculated counter-factual country-specific interest rates 
using a version of the ‘classical’ interest rate rule proposed by Taylor (1993). The rule 
sets 
  
 4.0 1.5*( 2.0) 0.125* tt t R GAP π =+ − +  (6) 
 
This rule is based on an average real interest rate of 2.0 percent, an inflation target of 
2.0 percent,  t π  is the inflation rate and  t GAP  is the OECD’s calculated output gap for 
each country. This specification conforms to the standard principles of Taylor rules: 
respond aggressively to inflation signals but also take into account deviations of 
output from its estimated potential level.
44 Table 5.1 presents data on the distribution 
of the implied country-specific interest rates, expressed as deviations from the 
German rate.
45 The calculation confirms that ‘freely-chosen’ interest rates would have 




A complementary approach to addressing this question is to treat the specification in 
equation (2) as a regime-independent model of inflation. In this case, monetary policy 
                                                 
44 There is a literature on the specification of Taylor rules for open economies. Variation in trade 
openness may mean that the optimal coefficients in the Taylor rule should vary country by country. In 
addition, an additional exchange rate term could be added to the rule that would imply interest rate 
responses to exchange rate fluctuations. However, Leitemo and Soderstrom (2001) find that adding an 
exchange rate term adds little to performance and the simple rule here is useful for illustrative 
purposes. 
45 Some other authors have implemented similar rules for the aggregate eurozone economy (Faust et al 
2001, von Hagen and Bruckner 2002). By expressing the constructed interest rates  in terms of 
deviations from the German level, the impact of alternative choices concerning the target nominal 
interest rate and inflation rate is minimized. 
46 France has the lowest implied interest rate in each year; Ireland has the maximum in 1999-2000, with 
the Netherlands the maximum in 2001.   26
would operate by affecting the values of the regressors: in particular, would country-




Taking these in reverse order, it seems likely that at least some of the member 
countries would have acted to prevent large movements in their effective exchange 
rates by raising interest rates in response to the dollar appreciation in 1999-2000.  For 
instance, as was noted in section 3, the historical evidence for Ireland is that it would 
have acted to eliminate about half of the dollar-DM movement. A combination of 
higher interest rates and less currency depreciation would have acted to moderate 
inflation pressures in these countries.  
 
With regard to the output gap, there are several reasons to believe output gaps would 
have been smaller under national monetary policies. Most obviously, a counter-
cyclical monetary policy would have helped to close output gaps. In addition, as was 
discussed earlier, one source of domestic demand in the high growth economies has 
been the sharp fall in interest rates relative to pre-EMU levels in these countries: in 
the absence of EMU, any such interest rate reduction would have been smaller and 
would have been smoothed out under standard monetary procedures. Another 
contributor to output gaps has been the exchange rate depreciation in some of the 
countries: as noted above, the scale of depreciation in several countries would have 
been muted by interest rate increases under independent monetary policies. 
 
Regarding the other variables included in equation (6), would fiscal policy have been 
more restrictive in the high-inflation countries under an alternative monetary regime? 
With higher interest rates, it seems likely that primary deficits would likely have been 
lower. However, it is plausible that the price level convergence effect may have been 
weaker in the absence of a common currency. The common currency has increased 
the transparency of price differentials (especially since the introduction of notes and 
coins in 2002) and may have also increased trade integration.
48 In that case, the low-
                                                 
47 We take the initial price level as largely independent of monetary policy during this period. 
48 See Rose (2000) and the subsequent empirical literature on this point. However, Rogers (2002) 
argues that the price level convergence effect is no stronger among the eurozone countries than among 
the wider EU club.   27
price countries would have experienced lower inflation and the high-price countries 
faster inflation. 
 
The discussion so far in this section does suggest that a superior inflation performance 
may have been attainable under independent monetary policies. However, proponents 
of a single currency can point to some counter-arguments. First, the ongoing 
integration of European product and factor markets (possibly accelerated by the 
advent of EMU) will plausibly erode persistent inflation differentials. In line with the 
price level convergence effect, the scope for dispersion in traded goods prices is 
falling. Labour markets are also responding, with high-growth countries receiving net 
inflows of migrants, easing pressure on wage rates.
49 Finally, there are indications of 
increased portfolio diversification among the eurozone countries that should partially 
smooth out national income shocks through risk sharing. However, we also note that 
the absence of a eurozone federal fiscal system means that an important risk-sharing 
mechanism in the US is not available to the eurozone countries. 
 
6.  Implications for Accession Countries 
The relevant initial conditions of the accession countries and other prospective euro 
members differ widely.  Accordingly, while there are some general implications, these 
would have to be interpreted on a country-by-country basis, a task which is not 
attempted here.   
 
Overall, the experience of the first several years of the system reveals that 
convergence of inflation rates cannot be expected to be as tight or as quick as had 
been anticipated by some.  We view the ‘price convergence’ effect as generally 
benign and self-limiting: temporary inflation differentials are a necessary part of the 
transition to long-run real exchange rate equilibrium.   
 
With respect to the divergence in inflation rates that is induced by variation in 
exposure to shocks to the external value of the euro, policy should not over-react to 
such dispersion since the nominal exchange rate movements themselves are sure to be 
                                                 
49 The correlation between output gaps and net immigration during 1999-2000 was 0.70.   28
limited and largely self-correcting as long as monetary authorities in the leading 
countries continue to succeed in restraining inflation over the long-term. 
 
The accession countries and the member states which have not adopted the euro are, 
on average, as highly specialized in trade with the current EMU participants as the 
latter are themselves (Table 6.1).  If we take the non-EMU imports as a percentage of 
GDP, this is not much higher on average in the accession countries and is actually 
lower in each of the “out” countries, by comparison with the “ins”.  There is 
considerable variation.  Estonia and Malta are rather highly exposed to non-EMU 
trade, though neither to the same extent as Ireland.  These countries can be expected 
to experience wider fluctuations in their CPI inflation, though hardly to an extent that 
would make a case for delaying EMU membership. 
 
Does CPI volatility from such a source matter for policy?    In terms of monetary and 
exchange rate policy, if a case could be made for augmenting mean EMU-wide 
inflation with some function of the cross-country variance of inflation as the target for 
EMU policy, then it would follow that the external exchange rate of the euro could 
become a useful intermediate objective or indicator of monetary policy.  However, the 
assessment of whether the ECB should stabilize the external value of the euro would 
surely be much more heavily influenced by other factors than this consideration.
50 On 
the whole, there seems little reason to over-react.  
 
There is another potential dimension to exchange rate policy, namely the 
establishment of bilateral arrangements for stabilizing exchange rates between the 
euro and the currencies of “fringe” trading partners (Honohan, 1999).  With 
enlargement both of the EU and EMU membership, the potential gains from such 
arrangements will already be largely secured and, in any case, would have little 
impact compared to the volatility of bilateral exchange rates vis-à-vis major trading 
partners such as the US and Japan. 
 
                                                 
50 Some degree of exchange rate stability can be achieved via sterilized intervention (the ECB and other 
central banks in late 2000 established a floor to the dollar/euro rate through coordinated euro purchases 
on foreign exchange markets). In principle, a global target-zone system could also be envisaged by 
which Europe, the US and Japan coordinate monetary policies to limit exchange volatility among the 
major currencies. There seems little appetite for such a reform of the international monetary system at 
present.   29
Should national fiscal deficits and surpluses be employed as a tool to damp inflation 
fluctuations?  The standard prescription is that fiscal policy should be more counter-
cyclical to compensate for the absence of an independent monetary policy (cf. EEAG, 
2003, Chapter 2). However, in line with Perotti (2003) and others, we found little 
econometric evidence of the stabilizing properties of discretionary adjustments to the 
budget balance beyond those captured in the output gap.
51 Moreover, the empirical 
investigation by Lane (2003) suggests that governments find it hard for political 
reasons to push the discretionary component of fiscal policy in a counter-cyclical 
direction. In combination with the well-known problem of correctly timing fiscal 
interventions, these results suggest that national fiscal policy does not offer a “silver 
bullet” in tackling excessive inflation differentials. It seems to us that further research 
on the appropriate role for discretionary fiscal policy in regional stabilization must be 
a high priority for European macroeconomists.  
 
Perhaps the major message is for those involved in wage negotiations.  Although we 
have argues that exchange-rate induced surges in national inflation are likely to be 
reversed, this view may not be shared by those negotiating on behalf of organized 
labour.  Multi-year wage collective bargaining settlements based on an expectation of 
continued above-EMU average inflation could be very damaging to the 
competitiveness of labour in such circumstances.   Given that the accession countries 
can be expected to support higher than average real wage increases on a sustained 
basis in the years ahead as their level of average productivity converges to the 
frontier, it will be much more difficult for negotiators in those countries to compute 
the appropriate and affordable rate of wage increase and the exchange-rate induced 
effects might easily be ignored or misinterpreted in making such calculations.  
Recognizing and calculating the external sources of inflation can, as we have shown, 
be of material significance here. 
 
Macroeconomic conditions at entry also need careful management.  We have already 
seen how a sharp fall in nominal and real interest rates contributed to demand pressure 
in Ireland and this will also ease budgetary constraints allowing a relaxation of fiscal 
                                                 
51 The point estimates we obtained – though rarely significant – implied a disinflationary effect for 
expansionary fiscal policy, conditional on the output gap (a result also found by Canova and Pappa 
2003). Indeed, this is the policy prescription of Duarte and Wolman (2002): income tax reductions 
during a boom can have a moderating impact on inflationary pressures.     30
discipline. New entrants should beware of allowing their economies to overheat in this 
way.
52  Careful attention should be paid to the rate at which currencies are pegged, 
especially for those countries which will experience a large fall in nominal interest 





Despite the common currency, exchange rate movements have had a substantial effect 
on inflation movements and inflation differentials in EMU.  This is partly because of 
the different degrees of exposure of member states to trade outside the euro zone.  The 
diverging inflation rates have coincided with convergence of price levels is in part 
secular in nature and but may also reflect a recurrent – although largely unnoticed – 
feature of episodes of dollar strength.  Much of the remaining pattern of inflation 
movements can be explained by national output gaps. The inclusion of fiscal 
imbalances adds no significant explanatory power.  The initial fall in nominal and real 
interest rates – quite different across countries – likely not only contributed to 
inflationary pressures via raising aggregate demand in goods markets but may also 
have contributed to dispersion in property price movements in the run-up to and early 
years of EMU. 
 
Although the observed differentials seem to have as a surprise to some observers, they 
are little larger than those experienced across US regions in the same years.  To some 
extent, inflation differentials may be more persistent within a currency union than 
outside it in that national inflation rates and real interest rates are inversely related 
inside a currency union, generating a procyclical dynamic. From a policy perspective, 
finding institutional mechanisms that minimize the risk of real exchange rate 
overshooting is a high priority.  
 
                                                 
52 Current inflation and real interest rate conditions differ widely among candidate countries.  The latest 
4-quarter mean inflation is almost 10 per cent, though less than 4 per cent for the ten countries expected 
to join the EU in 2004.  Real ex post short-term interest rates recently varied from 10-11 per cent in 
Poland and Romania to negative values in Bulgaria.  Real interest rates in Turkey have been extremely 
volatile.   31
Finally, although differential productivity growth has not featured centrally in the 
inflation experience of existing members in the early years, it will surely be a more 
relevant factor when accession countries join the euro. To the extent that inflation 
differentials reflect price level convergence and the operation of the Balassa-
Samuelson mechanism, one can view such inflation differentials benignly. However, 
real appreciation inside a currency union also carries risks. With a low common 
nominal interest rate, real interest rates in the high-inflation countries will be negative. 
In turn, this may fuel an expenditure boom, generating extra inflationary pressure 
through an emerging output gap and a rapid runup in property prices. The potential 
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Table 4.1.  Summary Inflation Statistics: the Eurozone and US regions 
 Eurozone    US  Regions 
 1999  2000  2001   1999  2000  2001 
Mean 0.015 0.028 0.030   0.023 0.035 0.031 
St  Dev  0.008 0.010 0.011   0.008 0.008 0.009 
CV  0.512 0.354 0.364   0.341 0.230 0.307 
Max  0.025 0.052 0.052   0.042 0.058 0.054 
Min  0.005 0.019 0.018   0.010 0.017 0.012 
Range  0.020 0.033 0.034   0.032 0.041 0.042 
 
Note: In this table, mean inflation rates are unweighted averages across eurozone member countries 
and US regions respectively. The US regions are XXX. Source: European data from Eurostat’s HICP 
database; US data from Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Long-term Inflation Differentials 
 
      R a n g e  
(1) Euro  Core  1972-1998    0.20 
(2) US  Regions 1976-1995    0.61 
(3) US  Regions 1926-1995    0.95 
 
Notes:  Euro Core is Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, France and Italy. In columns (1)-(2), 
range is in average annual inflation rates (measured in DM for the Euro Core). In column (3), it is the 
mean range for non-overlapping decadal intervals over 1926-1995.  Sources: Euro Core data adapted 
from Walton and Deo (1999); US Regions calculations adapted from Cecchetti et al (2002).   36
Table 4.3:  Pass-through and related relationships 
  
  A   B    C  D  E 
dep. var.:  ∆neer  ∆cpi  ∆cpi  ∆cpi  ∆cpi 
  Estimate (t-stat) Estimate (t-stat) Estimate (t-stat) Estimate (t-stat) Estimate (t-stat) 
a1  0.000 0.4  1.967 3.9 1.962 3.5 1.115 3.6 1.012 1.8 
a2 (at)  -0.110 5.0    -0.023 1.3      -0.134 0.9 
a2 (be)  -0.169 7.7    -0.071 4.1      -0.355 3.5 
a2  (de)  -0.228  10.3    -0.037 2.1      -0.109 1.5 
a2  (fi)  -0.235  10.7    -0.105 6.1      -0.301 4.6 
a2  (fr)  -0.192 8.7    -0.046 2.6      -0.244 2.6 
a2  (ie)  -0.350  15.9    -0.103 5.9      -0.206 4.2 
a2  (it)  -0.186 8.4    -0.024 1.4      -0.100 1.1 
a2  (lu)  -0.072  3.3          
a2  (ne)  -0.196 8.9    0.005 0.3      0.060 0.6 
a2  (pt)  -0.163 7.4    0.000 0.0      0.108 1.1 
a2  (sp)  -0.162 7.3    -0.030 1.7      -0.144 1.3 
a2       -0.043 6.0    -0.161  5.2    
a3      -0.067 3.3 -0.064 3.4 -0.021 1.6 -0.019 1.3 
a4 (at)      -0.024 3.2 -0.024 3.3 -0.189 4.0 -0.202 3.4 
a4 (be)      -0.019 2.6 -0.020 2.7 -0.112 3.2 -0.117 2.6 
a4  (de)      -0.017 2.4 -0.018 2.5 -0.074 3.0 -0.079 2.5 
a4  (fi)      -0.024 3.1 -0.026 3.5 -0.111 4.5 -0.120 3.8 
a4  (fr)      -0.011 1.5 -0.012 1.6 -0.064 2.0 -0.073 1.7 
a4  (ie)      -0.068 6.7 -0.069 7.2 -0.117 7.7 -0.125 6.2 
a4  (it)      -0.030 3.8 -0.028 3.7 -0.110 4.0 -0.108 3.2 
a4  (ne)      -0.049 5.8 -0.045 5.7 -0.208 6.2 -0.175 4.4 
a4  (pt)      -0.052 5.8 -0.048 5.8 -0.213 6.1 -0.196 5.0 
a4  (sp)      -0.044 5.1 -0.041 5.1 -0.200 5.7 -0.192 4.6 
ar(1)  0.404  5.2  0.803 14.5 0.845 14.5 0.708 10.9 0.831 11.1 
Countries/obs.  11 143 10 140 10 140 10 140 10 140 
Years  1999:1-2002:2 1999:1-2002:2 1999:1-2002:2 1999:1-2002:2 1999:1-2002:2 
Method Unweighted  panel  Unweighted  panel Unweighted  panel Unweighted  panel Unweighted  panel 
RSQ/DW  0.854 2.06 0.895 1.82 0.925 1.62 0.898 1.78 0.914 1.75 
 
Note: ar(1) is first order autocorrelation coefficient. Regression A is: ∆neer=a+bi ∆euro;  Variables: ∆neer, ∆euro are 
log-change in the nominal effective exchange rate index (ifs ..ne) and in the (reciprocal of) euro/$ exchange rate (ifs  
163..rh).   Regressions B and C are of the form ∆cpii = a1 + a2i ∆euro(-1) + a3 cpii(-1) + a4i euro(-2), where cpi is ifs line 
64 (rebased); Regressions D and E replace euro with neer.   37
 
Table 4.4. Panel Inflation Regressions: Pooled OLS Estimates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CPI  CPI-EN  PGDP  WAGE 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 
        
Lagged Price Level  -0.030  -0.042  -0.065  -0.013 
  (2.9)*** (4.9)*** (6.2)*** (1.1) 
        
D(NEER) -0.28  -0.3  -0.39  -0.44 
  (2.7)** (2.6)** (1.97)* (2.2)** 
        
Fiscal  Surplus  2.5 4.2 7.7 1.1 
  (0.3) (0.6) (0.7) (1.1) 
        
Output  Gap  0.22 0.28 0.34 0.59 
  (2.65)**  (3.81)*** (3.62)*** (4.14)*** 
        
        
SE of Regression  0.007  0.006  0.009  0.009 
        
Adjusted R Squared  0.61  0.75  0.65  0.68 
 
Note: All equations include time dummies. Standard errors are White-corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
*,**, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.    38
Table 4.5. Panel Inflation Regressions: Pooled GMM Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPI CPI-EN  PGDP  WAGE 
GMM GMM GMM GMM 
    
Lagged Price Level  -0.032  -0.046  -0.067  -0.018 
 (4.5)***  (7.4)***  (7.3)***  (1.4) 
        
D(NEER) -0.28  -0.26  -0.36  -0.35 
 (3.4)***  (2.9)***  (2.2)**  (2.4)** 
        
Fiscal Surplus  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2 
 (1.7)  (2.8)**  (1.1)  (2.1)** 
        
Output Gap  0.23  0.34  0.37  0.71 
 (4.0)***  (6.1)***  (2.7)**  (7.6)*** 
        
        
SE of Regression  0.007  0.006  0.009  0.009 
        
Adjusted R Squared  0.6  0.73  0.65  0.65 
 
Note: All equations include time dummies. Standard errors are White-corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
In the GMM estimation, the fiscal surplus and output gap are instrumented by their lagged values. *,**, 
*** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively.    39
Table 4.6. Expanded Specifications: CPI Inflation, OLS  Estimation 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
        
Lagged  Price    -0.030 -0.029 -0.039 -0.036 -0.039 -0.032 
Level  (2.9)*** (3.4)*** (1.95)*  (2.1)**  (-1.98)* (-1.7)* 
        
D(NEER)  -0.275 -0.265 -0.266 -0.255 -0.293 -0.174 
  (2.7)** (2.8)** (2.6)** (2.3)** (-2.8)**  (-1.1) 
        
Fiscal  Surplus  0.025   0.017 0.022 0.016 0.007 
  (0.3)   (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) 
        
Output  Gap  0.221 0.221 0.225 0.223 0.273 0.172 
  (2.7)** (2.6)** (2.7)** (2.7)** (1.9)*  (1.6) 
        
Lagged  Prod    0.004   0.004   
Level    (0.5)   (0.5)   
        
D(Prod)      -0.08   
      (-0.4)   
        
Lagged  YC     0.002   0.001 
Level     (0.5)   (0.3) 
        
D(YC)       0.073 
       (0.6) 
        
SE of 
Regression 
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
        
Adjusted R 
Squared 
0.606 0.621 0.592 0.591 0.576 0.576 
 
Note: Prod is labour productivity in the business sector; YC is GDP per capita.   
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.  40
 
Table 4.7. Expanded Specifications: CPI Inflation, Pooled GMM Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CPI CPI CPI CPI 
GMM GMM GMM GMM 
    
Lagged Price Level  -0.040  -0.039  -0.038  -0.038 
 (2.6)**  (2.8)**  (3.0)***  (2.8)** 
        
D(NEER) -0.270  -0.307  -0.259  -0.254 
 (3.3)***  (3.2)***  (2.7)**  (1.6) 
        
Fiscal Surplus  0.068  0.043  0.075  0.075 
 (1.7)  (0.8)  (1.8)*  (2.1)* 
        
Output Gap  0.239  0.260  0.240  0.239 
 (4.4)***  (3.1)***  (4.2)**  (2.7)** 
        





        
D(Prod)   -0.068 
(0.4) 
  
        
Lagged YC Level      0.002  0.002 
     (0.6)  (0.6) 
        
D(YC)       0.003 
       (0.03) 
        
SE of Regression  0.007  0.008  0.007  0.008 
        
Adjusted R Squared  0.586  0.574  0.585  0.565 
 
Note: Prod is labour productivity in the business sector; YC is GDP per capita.   
Source: OECD Economic Outlook database.  41
 
Table 4.8: Sensitivity Analysis: CPI, GMM Estimates 
 
Sample Lag Price Levelt-value DNEER t-value PRIM t-value GAP t-value  Adjusted R2
Full -0.032 -4.532 -0.283 -3.427 0.073 1.713 0.231 3.992 0.683
Austria -0.029 -2.730 -0.188 -2.081 0.048 0.853 0.265 4.760 0.667
Belgium -0.033 -3.699 -0.283 -3.466 0.077 1.398 0.240 3.918 0.674
Finland -0.038 -2.357 -0.367 -3.129 0.445 0.676 0.320 1.747 0.531
France -0.027 -3.193 -0.281 -2.781 0.037 0.665 0.197 2.947 0.681
Germany -0.033 -3.100 -0.302 -3.091 0.076 1.193 0.227 2.650 0.656
Ireland -0.032 -3.349 -0.439 -2.070 0.059 0.757 0.274 2.134 0.607
Italy -0.032 -3.794 -0.295 -3.314 0.061 1.028 0.210 2.818 0.690
Netherlands -0.035 -4.992 -0.353 -4.119 0.073 1.969 0.189 3.337 0.836
Portugal -0.036 -3.444 -0.258 -2.821 0.080 1.899 0.260 4.658 0.673
Spain -0.035 -4.088 -0.248 -3.304 0.077 1.349 0.240 3.790 0.712
Mean -0.033 -3.571 -0.300 -3.055 0.100 1.227 0.241 3.341 0.674
St Dev 0.003 0.767 0.067 0.602 0.115 0.480 0.038 0.980 0.073
Max -0.027 -2.357 -0.188 -2.070 0.445 1.969 0.320 4.760 0.836
Min -0.038 -4.992 -0.439 -4.119 0.037 0.665 0.189 1.747 0.531
Range 0.012 2.635 0.251 2.049 0.409 1.304 0.131 3.013 0.304 
 










Year Mean  StDev  Min  Max 
     
     
1999  1.36 1.21 -0.19  3.21 
2000  1.30 1.67 -0.17  5.52 




Note: National interest rates as deviations from implied German interest rate. 
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Table 6.1:  Direction of Trade 2000-1 
 Non-EMU  imports
 as % GDP
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Figure 3.2  Irish real wages,1994-2002 


































Figure 3.3  Irish Inflation and Currency Depreciation, 1994-2002 
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